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THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION?
· INTELLEcroALS IN UNIFIED GERMANY

I

r! will begin by asking your indulgence.

You no doubt realize that I am a political

i

scientist' and that my discipline has its own set of isms at its disposal: the ones of greatest
significance to my work are socialism, fascism, communism,_ and capitalism. Yet the debate in
which I will attempt to engage you necessarily includes references to post-modernism,
aestheticism and, heaven help me, deconstructionism. My understanding. of those terms does
not necessarily coincide with their application in the field of literary criticism ....
The title of my talk infers a three-fold task:

the first objective is to explore the

. traditional role of German intellectuals as the "conscience" of the nation. The second task is to
explore the role of intellectuals thrown into a state of turbulence over the need to reconfigure
the idea of a single German "nation," a task which many cannot undertake in good conscience.
My final aim is to consider the extent to which developments subsequent to the more or less
miraculous opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 do or do not offer some prospect of
rendering the intellectuals of East and West "unified" at some point in the foreseeable future.
·WHO ARE THE INTELLECTUALS?

I will argue that the role of German intellectuals has been fundamentally redefined since

I

1945, and that the ranks .of postwar intellectuals have been anything but orderly and cohesive,
in stark contrast to the united front projected by intellectual elite(s) of earlier eras. Yet it would
be too simple !O attribute ·those differences to the impact of political division alone, that is, into
categories of Eastern v·ersus Western Dichterlnnen und Denkerlnnen. Consonant with many
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other political cultural changes that have taken root within the two German states since WWII,
our understanding of who is/who isn't an intellectual has been clouded, or at least made more
complex, by ah ostensible changing of the generational guard.

Allow me to back-track a bit

for the benefit of those who are not well acquainted with German history and culture.
The classical model of the intellectual (to which I was exposed as a graduate student
· through the work of Fritz Ringer) centered on the Gennan Mand(l,rins of the Pre-World.War
II Era, most of whom were professor-philosophers, historians or legal theorists by nature and

profession. They were riot men or women of letters in the literary sense; their writings were
politically controversial at times but they had little in common with our cont~mporary image of
number-crunching sodal scientists. The more prominent members of this generation included
Carl Schmitt, Ernst Hinger, Max Weber, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Mannheim--[Gruppenbild

mit Darnen] Hannah Arendt was the outstanding exception to the rule. Raised in the academic
tradition of Wilhelm von Humboldt [Einsamkeit und Freiheit], the Mandarins perceived
themselves as a kind of "spiritual aristocracy" (in German sense of Geist) attuned to values of
a higher culture. 1 As self-appointed though nonetheless distanced "diagnosticians of the times,"
.

.

this· breed of German intellectuals spoke pf power, will, and (self-) determination, yet they
feared the darker side of democracy--a system.with which they would have, in fact, had precious
·•little experience, most of which was negative, between 1919 and 1933 [Weimar]i Adverse to
the prospect of vulgar populism, mob rule or Bonapartism, those who grudgingly accepted the
ideal of democracy as superior to authoritarian forms of government (e.g-., Max Weber) sooner
envisioned it as the "circulation of elites 11--the very critique C. Wright Mills would lodge against
.

.

.

.

the practice of democracy in the Uriited·States during the 1960s. 2 These intellectuals found it
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easy to justify their role as the "conscience of the nation," given the limited amount of trust or
confidence they placed in the rest of the Volk comprising the nation. In the words of Schmitt,

· "The people can only say yes or no,· they cannot advise, deliberate or discuss,· they cannot
govern or administer; they also cannot establish standards, but rather only sanction a given set
of standards with a yes'' (Schmitt, 1968, p. 93).
The Mandarins of old mourned the decline of the "West" (Otto Spengler, Nietsche) and
sought solace in antiquity (Schliemann). Though not adverse to the "welfare-paternalism of the
police state" instituted under Bismarck (deriving from an older tradhion of noblesse oblige), they
did not care to pollute their political discourse with questions of social relevance or justice.
Both their "higher conception of polities"--i.e., an illusory belief in their own ability·to "lead
the Leader" [den Fuhrer filhren] a la Heidegger--and their holistic idealization of the nation
(apotheosis reified) was utterly and definitively discredited by the postwar revelations of the
Holocaust, especially those Nazi crimes against humanity committed in the name of Wissenschaft
(Blockhouse 10 at Auschwitz). Their sort was quickly overwhelmed by the power of expanding
economic "interests" and the "triumph of ideology" (over idealism) which.became Germany's
surrogate for national politics and identity subsequent to the 1945 collapse of the Reich.
The next wave of intellectuals to emerge as voices of the newly-divided "national
conscience" after 1949 stemmed from what I have labeled Aufbau or Reconstruction

Generation. It is quite significant that many of the German figures who acquired a measure of
intellectual prominence throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained outside of formal institutions
(with the exception of a few in the GDR who were needed to foster legitimacy for the new
regime). They were largely authors and sometime professional moralists (theologians), with
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only few academics thrown in for good measure. They sought to establish for themselves an
independent position vis-a-vis society, the unintended consequence of which was their subsequent
difficulty in forging a positive relationship with that society in relation to questions of national
identity .. Unwilling to build on pre-existing structures and competing traditions, "they declared
the past suspect and no longer useful; this at a time when the general populace was yearning for
some sort of secure footing. "3
The values heralded by intellectuals in the Western state included universalism,
individualism, progressivism and resistallce; among the key thinkers of this era were Karl
Jaspers, Carl von Weizsacker, Heinrich Boll, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Gunter Grass,
Helmut Gollwitzer, and Walter Jens). They would reflect the concerns of what Helmut Schelsky
came to call the skeptical generation..
The core values espoused by ·their counterparts in the East German state likewise
revolved around resistmce, universalism and humanism, coupled with a distinctive interpretation
of social justice/solidarity (largely at odds with the western emphasis on individualism).
Representative.figures linked to this generation in the GDR included Johannes R. Becker, Anna
Seghers, Robert Havemann, Rudolph Bahro, Christa Wolf--you will note that women appear on
the iist only on the Eastern side. I do not intend to debate whether the Eastern thinkers were
"free" to market their ideas and ideals in the Western sense. My argument is limited to the
influence of generational factors, in particular, the extent to which one's biographical proximity
to the traumas of WWII serve to determine what one's specific responsibilities "to the nation"
ought to be ..
This was (and remains) a generation of thinkers whose moral authority derived primarily
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from its anti-nationalism, from its highly critical response to the collective past, and from its
dream of a "better (that is, perpetually anti-fascist) Germany." As Albrecht Weber opfoed:
The evil national question was ... set aside. National consciousness was put
in a category somewhere between error and crime. In the state of national
paralysis, national identity was to be replaced with either a social or a
European identity. . . . Literature became ahistorical and as a consequence
. . ·. nation and state became objects of . . . cynical . . . criticism.4
The Narrenfreiheit, alternatively, the poetic license afforded by their chosen medium of literature
(novels, short-'-stories, plays and sermons), allowed them to dig deeply into the human psyche,
to seek links between fascism and the human condition when the official "explanations" afforded·
by their respective governments feU quite short .of the truth. Although their aversions to the
nationalist past frequently overlapped, the intellectuals of the two postwar states often drew very
different political conclusions and lessons from history. They were neither militantly antimodernity, nor have their values rested on absolute truth claims (in fact, a few seemed a bit too
attached to relativity in my judgment, e.g. Historikerstreit). In this they differed substantially
from the Mandarins preceding them: they embraced more radical forms of democracy, "radical"
in the sense that _neither side believed that real democracy could be achieved prior to a
fundamental transformation of existing educational, cultural and economic institutions. Unlike
their predecessors, these intellectuals did not consciously avoid discussions of social justice, even
though those discussions were sometimes veiled as literary treatments (e.g., Boll's Die Verlorene

Ehre . ... ) Sometimes they were more direct in their criticisms, channeled through the medium
of ·party-political involvement, for example. There were, in any case, significant gaps to be
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found between the theory and praxis of democracy in both systems through the early 1970s.
Among the intellectuals of Reconstruction age, the focus on the past--bordering
occasionally on the obsessive--superceded the need for critiques of the present, or to put it more
accurately: their critiques of the present eventually became a "failure to reflect and willingness
to go along" with the conditions of one's own era. The dilemmas faced by GDR intellectuals
were particularly acute, where the options were often reduced to Weg-gehen oder Hier-bleiben.
John Borneman has argued that neither Gunter Grass (West) nor Christa Wolf (East), proved
capable of coupling their profound insights regarding the National-Socialist past with a
comparable, equally self-critical analysis of their lives in the Bundesrepublik or the DDR. 5 The ·
present was critiqued primarily as a vehicle for preserving memory and warning against a
repetition of the past--leaving a large zone of mutual acceptance or ·"agreed upon silences"
particulary in the GDR.
.

.

A new generation qua new breed of intellectuals appeared on the scene as of the late
Sixties/early Seventies, evincing a loss of common ground after two deccides of separation. I
label my Western sample the Sixty-Eighters; I believe their East German countetparts are best
characterized as the Blocked Generation.

"Born into" their respective postwar states, the

members of these two groups sought no distance from the present but rather tried to shape it.
In fact, Gegenwartsbewaltigung was and remains the primary focus of their critical reflections.
1968 was a year of world-historical import for thinkers on both sides of the Wall, albeit for
different reasons._
Like their French counterparts storming the academic Bastille of the Sorbonne in Paris_,
West German university students took to the streets by the hundreds of thousands, demanding
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an end to elitist admissions policies, hierarchical administrative structures, arcane curricular
requirements, the Vietnam war, and Third World exploitation, inter alia. Rejecting the "internal
immigration" of earlier cohorts, the social thinkers born of the Sixties viewed their intellectual
predecessors as "little more than court jesters" for the existing.order; what they lacked were
agents and role models for cultural revolution. Rather than limit themselves to the task of
discursive social criticism, many members of this generation thus opted to become Do-ityourself-Realpolitiker or at least critical theorists of real-political developments a la Jurgen

Habermas. Their names read like a Who's Who of Social Democratic electioneers and Green
Party protest managers: the list includes but is not limited to Peter Glotz, Joshka Fischer, Daniel
Cohn-Bendit;. the literary exception to the rule is Berlin author Peter·Schneider; one woman
occasionally mentioned in. the course of deeper debates about the present' s relation to the past
is once-theologi.an Antje Vollmer.
The Sixty-Eighters, over time, have distanced themselves from the Mandarins' "passion. ate distaste for industry and capital, fot bureaucracy and parliament;" they have abandoned the
media of philosophical treatise and historical novel for the venues of radio, TV talk-shows and
the popular press. They do, however, continue to propagate an image of of the world (or at
least their part of it) as constantly subject to impending crisis and imminent doom (vis-a-vis the
government's claims that all is well with Germany except, of course, for a few blips on the postWall screen that are largely the folly or fault of youth). As citizen"'philosophers qua political
· subjects, they claim for themselves the "right to makepolitical mistakes, just like anyone else. "6
Prior to 1989 they preferred not to be bothered with talk ·about "the nation," portraying
themselves as post-nationalists at best.

8

Allow me to reflect at some length on their post-Wall responses to the nation-reunified,
which I can only evaluate in light of their favorite activity, protest. Hostilities in the Persian
Gulf less than one year after the peaceful collapse of East Germany evoked a special crisis of
identity among members of the 68-Generation, in particular among the Left. The Gulf War
redefined as paradoxical two heretofore unchallengable value-premises of postwar German
culture: first, that the citizens of the new Republic would never again voluntarily engage in
barbaric acts of war, and secondly, that Germans must bear a special responsibility for
preventing genocidal attacks against Jews world-wide.
The result was a palpable, painful division among the· intellectual Left.

Prominent

pacifists such as Petra Kelly and Wolfgang.Biermann (and Enzensberger) joined the ranks of the
war's supporters [die Bellizisten], while other protest veterans such as Alice Schwarzer, Vera
Wollenberger (and old-guard Gunter Grass) assumed more traditional Pazifisten postures.
Green-Minister Joschka Fischer expressed sympathy for the targets of Scud-missile assaults in
Tel Aviv, while Hans Christian Strobele offended many with the observation (while in Israel!)
that such attacks were "the logical, almost imperative con·sequence of Israeli policy."
The identity crisis of the Left is at least partially grounded in the Sixty-Eighters' quixotic
reaction to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As Markovits noted in the mid 1980s, the German Left
evinces an ambivalent relation towards the state of Israel, the unquestioning embrace of which
they interpret as their fathers' and mothers' failure to admit guilt and complicity under the
Nazis. By identifying themselves with the FRG's official support of the Israeli state, New
Leftists have argued, their elders sought to relil).quish personal responsibility for the Final

Solution: Ergo, the New Left's unquestioning support for the Palestinians, manifested by the
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ever-present red/white or black/white scarves at each demonstration (which also fit neatly into
their scheme of revolutionary third-world, national-liberation causes).
Now that. the generation of founding fathers
and mothers has begun to die out, however,
.
'

the mantle of national guilt and moral responsibility falls directly on the shoulders of the
successor generation. Having long ago exonerated itself from that historical-guilt burden ( "the

blessing of having· been born late"), many grown-up leftists continue to blame Germany's faults
on ·"the system" in which they themselves have now become prominent actors and agents of
socialization.

Reactions toward the Gulf War, especially the hair-raising responses of_

fundamentalists like Stroebele, cannot be divorced from the process of unification itself. Now
in its forties, the aging Left is not only losing its ability to blame members of the foundinggeneration for its failure to "process" the Hitler legacy. The- other half of the equation is that
the very country the protest-professionals loved to hate and malign has ceased to exist as they
knew it. The allegedly anti-fascist, socialist alternative next door·(about which, in reality, they

also knew very little) has been exposed as a sham. In fact, the dissolution of "the other
Germany" has unleashed if not fostered new forces of right-wing extremism among youth
groups, that is, among their own offspring. Now nothing stands between the Germans-West and
the Old Reich, extending at least as far as the Oder-Neisse border.
Like it or not, the Long March Generation must become the transmitters of the whole
of German history, instead of looking for others to whom they can assign blame. They must
assume personal responsibility in order to pass an effective measure of historical remembrance
and moral responsibility on to the next generation (their children). The "system" argument will
not suffice to keep the memory of the Holocaust accurately alive. Ironically, many '68 'ers have
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themselves developed a sudden nostalgic attachment to the only (rump) state they have ever
known--now that the FRG they found in such desperate need of liberation has also ceased to
exist.
The fact that the post-nationalist intellectuals will continue to find it difficult to "close
the book" on German history, or to eschew the mantle of personal responsibility for events past
is reflected in their equally troubled reactions to civil war in the former Yugoslav Federation.
I must further argue (although I have no "hard data" to offer at this time) that countless protestveteran~ of the 1960s and 1970s find impossible to grasp that the very principles which had
presented themselves as utopian alternatives to the barbarity of the Third Reich--namely,
socialism and communism--could metamorphose almost overnight into the ultra-nationalist
nightmare of their elders.
There is less to be said about--indeed there was little that could be said by--their
generational counterparts in the GDR for whom the seminal event of the late Sixties was not an
internal cultural, feminist, and-war, "dare-more-democracy" (a la Willy Brandt) revolution but·
rather the crushing of the Prague Spring. This is the Blocked Generation in two respects: first,
the "intellectual greying-eminence" could not' be so quickly displaced, by virtue of the SED's
monopolistic control over all cultural and media institutions. Secondly, the GDR found a rather
easy solution to potential sources of criticism and dissent: it simply deported its problem-children ·
to the West (some went more "willingly" than others: Wolf Biermann, Jurgen Fuchs, Monika
Maron)--or allowed them to publish their most politically suspect works there, in exchange for
hard currency taxes on royalties.

Out of sight eventually meant out of mind, as far as

indigenous responses to these rabble-rousers went, and the displaced GDR-dissidents increasingly
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turned to a critique of West German society.
The final set .of intellectual cohorts addressed here consists of the Post-modernists of the

West and the new Aesthetes of the East. Bohemians we have always had with us, but these
types appear to have acquired new significance as of the early 1980s. While the intellectual
impetus for change seemed to emanate more strongly from the West through the 1960s and
1970s, up-and-coming Easterners played a more salient role in setting- intellectual trends during
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Die Hineingeborenen are those who entered a culture where
everything had ostensibly been predetermined, consolidated, stripped of sincerity, ausgeholt, and
increasingly impervious to change: thus their status and· self-understanding as "ideology-weary
post-modernists. 11

Quite cosmopolitan yet curiously apolitical by nature, the New Age

intellectuals silently began to disassociate themselves from the role of "morally engaged participants in the formation of informed public opinion, 11 to borrow from Dietze.

Preferring to

express their political opposition by virtue of their apoliticism, they retreated to an aesthetic
observation post, from which they appear to "intervene in public discussion only as interpreters
of interpretation . . . life either comes to mean too little or art too much. . . . It produces no
knowledge, at least not practical knowledge, but rather Not-Knowledge. "1

Their "radical

privatization of the utopian momentum" can be construed, respectively, as a defense against "the
tyranny of the market" (West) or against "the tyranny of a decrepit regime." Less heavily
mortgaged to German's political past, they have by and large, lost sight, of society as a
collectivity--a loose configuration of universals and particularistics--and hence they may have
even lost sight of the potential for collective action. Privatization and depoliticization have
provided little protection against a number of intellectual backlash movements since unification,
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however--even if the New Aesthetes themselves were not the first targets of assault.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLECTUAL: WAS BLEIBT?

The works of Christa Wolf embody the fate of "everywoman" (and "everyman") who
personally witnessed World War II and clung to the hope that a socialist Germany would prove
itself the all-encompassing moral alternative to its fascist predecessor. Born on March 18, 1939
in Landsberg/Warthe (East of the Oder), Christa Ihlenfeld "resettled" to Mecklenburg in 1945,
moved to Bad Frankenhausen in 1947, completed her Abitur two years later and immediately
joined the SED.
Wolf's literary success, added to her commitment to the anti-fascist, socialist cause, led
to quick political recognition in a system hungry for new sources of cultural legitimacy. She
served as a candidate-member of the Central Committee of the SED from 1963 to 1967,
accounting in part for her role as a featured speaker at 2nd Bitterfeld Conference in 1964 (setting
the parameters for a new "party line" on cultural policy between the VI. and VII. SED
Congresses).

In 1965 she addressed the 11. Plenum of the CC, voicing concern over the

lowering of cultural standards and the party's lack of trust in artists, despite the ostensible
consolidation of the GDR after 1961. She became a member of PEN-Zentrum (for Poets,
Essayists and Novelists) of the GDR in 1965, paving the way for her later participation in PENInternational Congresses (in Yugoslavia, Stockholm and Hamburg). Her book Juninach-mittag
appeared in 1967, followed one year later by Nachdenken uber Christa T, the work to which
Wolf attributes greatest personal significance--characterized as a "dialogical" treatment: the
narrator seeks political and moral relevance under "real-existing" socialism" in the life of a
friend who died in 1963--whose biography evinces extraordinary paraliels to Wolf's own. 8
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The next decade brought many 'direct confrontations between the Honecker regime and
;

'

· GDR intellectuals, rooted in the state's new strategy of quelling dissent by expe¥ing·outspokeri
artists to the West. Wolf was one of many signatories to an "Open Letter" prote~ting the forced
exile of Wolf Biermann in 1976. Appearing the same year, Kindheitsmuster portrayed a young
girl's search for a sense of personal responsibility, amidst a. Volk that uses col~ective amnesia

( "wo habt 1hr blojJ alle gelebt? ") to displace its need for amnesty, unable to recognize itself as
an accomplice to the Third Reich. But the past, in Wolf's own prescient words, "is not dead;

it is not even past. "9
Christa Wolf is the only Eastern writer to have received virtually every major prize for
literary achievement known to postwar Germany, East and West. 10 It was only her receipt of
•

I

the Geschwister-Scholl-Award in 1987 that appeared to generate controversy in 1987, insofar as
her "resistance" tothe Nazis had been more covert than overt in nature. The author participated
.

'

in the 1981 East-West Berliner Begegnung fiir Friedensjorderung, as well as in the second
international meeting of writers for peace in 1987. Following unification she was accorded yet
another honorary. doctorate by the University of Hildesheim (1990).
Christa Wolf's role in die Wende of 1989 was indirect but far from insignificant.
Together with other women writers, she helped to formulate the first critical resolution delivered
to the government in the name of the Schriftstellerverband on September 14, 1989. In October
she published two long articles in Die Wochenpost delivering a fundamental critique of the East
German educational system under the titles, "Das haben wir nicht gelernt" and "Es tut weh zu

wissen. " Within days she received several hundred letters from readers [published as Angepaj3t
oder mundig?] whose reactions--ranging from gratitude to desperation, and to otitrage--suggested
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that Wolf had lifted the iron curtain many had drawn around their own passive acceptance of yet
another authoritarian regime.

She moreover assisted in organizing the November 4th

demonstration in East Berlin which drew half a million participants, the largest protest gathering
in the country's forty-year history. On November 8 (the day before the Wall opened), she
appeared on East German television, urging would-be emigrants to remain and assist in
rebuilding a democratic GDR. Ironically this Appeal for our Land, signed by several hundred
artisans and writers, would not be published until November 28, 1989--the day FRG::Chancellor
Kohl announced his "Ten Point Program for Germany," leading to unification.
The June 1990 publication of her text, Was bleibt? (reportedly written in 1979) was
presented by Wolf not as an effort to justify her own "passive resistance" to the regime but as
an attempt to empathize with victims of the system by demonstrating that she, too, had been the
target of secret-police surveillance. Within days, select· journalists (Marcel Reich-Ranicki of
Literaturmagazin, Ulrich Greiner of Die Zeit, Frank Schirrmacher and Fritz Rudolf Fries of the
· 'Frankfurter Allgemeine) launched a public assault on Wolf, characterizing her as the "state's
poet-laureate" and the regime's "most prominent apologist..,,· It is hardly coincidental that all

those engaged in the post-mortem attack on the GDR writer were West German men, assailing
not Wolf's literary merits but her "guilty conscience" over "her hidden resistance plot . .. [as]
sentimental and unbelievable~

II

Only two female names figured in the entire debate, both of

them Eastern German (Monika Maron is the second). As Helga Konigsdorf observed at the
1990 Women in German Conference (Minneapolis), "It is easier to behead a queen than to
behead a king" (e.g., Hermann Kant or Heiner Muller).

Wolf was also caught in the tidal~wave of allegations over Stasi collaboration. Reporting
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the existence of ari "informal co-worker" (IM) file, identifying her under the code-naine

Margarete, Fritz Raddatz (Die Zeit, January 1993) labeled Wolf one of the Aujbau-Helfem eines
Veifolgungssystems ["construction workers of the persecution-regime"]. She and her husband
gained access to their "Victim-File" [Opfer-Akte] at the Gauck Behorde in May 1992, where she
was,_ in her words, "shocked to learn" she had been directly observed by the Stasi between 1955
and 1959, and classified as a "secret informer" (GI) from 1959_ to 1962. According to the
official documentation, she had been "recruited but did not-commit in her own hand-writing."
Wolf attempted to process the "complicit" elements of her past during her 1993 stay at the Getty
Institute.

She submitted to a public review of her "files," and offered a record of her

correspondence regarding those materials in the volume Akteneinsicht.

·

Long-time Western supporter Gunter Grass and others found themselves in the unfortunate
position of needing to defend Wolf not because they accepted her Stasi complicity per se, but
because they interpreted the media offensive as an attempt to 'delegitimize an entire generation
of those who had struggled to process or to keep alive the the memory of the fascist past.
The first wave of attack against cultural authorities as the shapers of national conscience
had barely subsided when the second campaign began. At least Wolf Biermann's attack on
"asshole Sasha Anderson" in October 1991 bore the semblance of an Ossi!ex-Ossi debate, but
Schirrmacher immediately took advantage of the opportunity to discredit an entire school of
poets linked to. a run-down section of East Berlin known as Prenzlauer Berg--and thus reaffirm
the superiority of West German aesthetics (" the myth of Prenzalauer Berg is dismissed . . . the

final belief in a genuine GDR-Art is destroyed"). As important as they may be in their own
right, revelations about Stasi informers are the ground upon which another more essential battle
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is being waged, namely, the struggle to (re) define the role of German intellectuals in public life
and their future "involvement in shaping national experience and imagination" (Michael Geyer).
Who, indeed, has the right to represent "the nation-united" in matters of moral responsibility?
A set of prominent "1989 revolutionaries" joined forces with a number of GDR expatriots (forced into exiled against their will in the mid-1970s) in denouncing the literary .
significance of a group so apolitical; one suspects the actions of the former were an attempt to
secure the historically unchallengeable nature of their own acts of political courage, refusal and
persecution. This then provoked Gunter Grass (West), Christoph Hein (East) and Stefan Heym
(East) to counter-attack Biermann (whom Grass had sheltered in his house in the Neidstrasse
during the 1970s) and Barbel Bohley as "character assassins." Intellectuals of the first postwar
generation seem to be motivated by a fear that the still-unforgivable Nazi Past is being quickly
forgotten,in the race to place new burdens of the Stasf-past on the shoulders of Eastern Germans
(as suggested by Jiirge~ Fuchs' questionable Gleichsetzung or characterization of the Stasibetrayals as the "Auschwitz of Souls." Further, Barbel Bohley: "He who does not despair that

peaceful family men were responsible for Auschwitz and does not despair that poets are stasiinformers, is incapable of despair"). They likewise fear that a universalized discrediting of any
literary group could set a precedent for backlash against other "moral-resistance" groups. The
all-or-nothing character of the debate [which I perceive to be so typisch deutsch], suggests that
the right to lead the nation, or at least to define what the new German nation ought to be, is also
an all-or-nothing proposition.
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THE INTELLECTUALS DISUNIFIED, ALBEIT DEMOCRATICALLY DISPLACED

The greatest challenge facing the (bigger if not automatically better) Federal Republic is
its need to reforge a sense of national identity from within, all of its day-to-day .(but by no
means undaunting) problems of administrative consolidation and economic transformation
notwithstanding. Let us not confuse dejure (unified Germany) with a de facto united Germany;
the fusion of Eastern and Western political culture is far from complete jn several respects.
Citizens in both the old and new Lander face a formidable psychological task, viz., overcoming
the four decades.of mutually antagonistic propaganda dished out by their respective governments.
The notion of Feindbilder [images of the enemy] sits deeper than either Easterners or_ Westerners
may care to admit to pollsters. For too many of the "losers" of unification (e.g., millions of
unemployed Ossis), the demise of the "enemy without" has given rise to a misguided search for
a new llenemy within. " (I offer as concrete evidence some 6000 acts of violence against
foreigners and the disabled, added to the public's tendency to blame would-be asylum seekers
for rising unemployment.)

It is moreover clear that the Germans unified must now find ways of coming to terms not
with one but with two pasts. The questions of who was really to blame and who has already
atoned for Third Reich atrocities, who precipitated the tensions and who paid the highest price
for the Cold Wat, are viewed through very different lenses in the East and West. Each side will
continue to draw different lessons from what appears to be a shared history for a decade or
-

.

more. The processes of generational change now underway in the long-separated states may
evince certain parallels, but they will not intersect for many citizens over 30 years of age; many
in the East will be denied the chance to undertake "the long march through the institutions" for
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. which they were originally destined (for example, those who served as junior faculty an_d
research staff at GDR universities).
As the onset of the Christa-Wolf-debacle (November 1990) and the commencement of
the Sasha-Anderson-Affair (November 1991) suggest, the "communicative silencing" of
intellectuals has been quite one-sided with regard to post-Wall discourse on guilt and complicity.
This has not been a profound debate among intellectual peers but rather a contest between
disempowered GDR literary figures and self-empowered FRG journalists. I believe there is an
even more disturbing dimension to this wave of intellectual silencing, however. In addition to
invalidating "the works of a lifetime" of specific individuals--(" her literary significance is widely

overrated and· some of her books have already been forgotten," wrote Schirrmacher)--the
"paradigm of Treason" smacks of a simultaneous effort to dismiss West German intellectuals on
the Left as both politically duped and (unjustifiably) morally self-righteous (even though Gunter
Grass and Walter Jens were both resolute critics of Stalinism and the Stasi). This three-pronged
attack enables the neo-conservative cultural moguls (I am tempted to say mongrels) to exonerate
themselves from the history of division and the dequalifications of unification.
Both the Eastern protagonists and their Western antagonists seem to have lost sight of the
fact that the relegated anti-fascism of the former and the clerical anti-communism of the latter
were essentially two sides of the same coin, "a complimentary [sic] one sidedness which
banished all contradictions from view. "11

Anti-nationalism under new labels after 1949

provided both sides with a form of self-legitimation divorced from a sustained, deliberate effort
to comprehend the nationally-rooted, materially-driven, socio-cultural mechanisms that made
Auschwitz possible, on the one hand. The need to structure their debate in terms of mutually

19
exclusive ideological premises led them to underestimate the measure of individual intolerance
and acquiescence to authority that rendered Auschwitz probable, on the other. The alternative
to communism is not nationalism but rather democracy, and such debates as we have witnessed
over the last three. years pay little homage to the pluralist foundation of democracy. 12
History and memory are. the things ofwhich ideological trench warfare are made. In this
respect I see the wholesale Stasi indictments as an attempt to preserve East Germany as "the
other" for purposes of future historical recrimination/blame, while designating the old Federal
Republic the "intellectual and political space" within which any future discourse on national
identity must take place. Prior to 1989 the debate regarding German national identity consisted
more often than not of "liturgical incantations" on the part of the Right, countered by "equally
ritualistic taboos" on the Left. The debate itself centered primarily on the question as to whether
or not a German ni!ion still existed or, alternatively, whether it possessed any right to exist ever
again; Now that the future has become the present, there is great confusion over the question
as to the future form and cont~nt of national identity.

Neither camp can continue to legitimize

the mutually exclusiye nature of its identity claims on the basis of what I will label, for lack of
a pithier term, the provisionality of the context. Historically speaking, the Germans have never
been.particularly well known for their willingness to search for· middle ground: It is· nonetheless
imperative that they recognize the re-configuration of national identity, first, as the outcome of
an ongoing process; secondly, as an activity which needs to take place upon a field of competing
discourses, and thirdly, that intellectuals, henceforth, will comprise but one group.eligible to
participate in the overarching debate regarding what it means to be a post-Wall German.
What is still missing from the core debate is the recognition of nation as a "negotiated
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heterogeneity rather than homogeneity imposed from above. 1113 German nationhood can neither ·
be construed as "an always fictional ethnic or cultural homogeneity,'·' nor as a· limited form of
heterogeneity that posits cultural difference as a justification for expelling those who embody

it.14
With mixed feelings, I accept Grabriele Dietze's diagnosis that what we are really
witnessing is not the clash of irreconcilable intellectual cultures but rather the death of the
representative intellectual as the moral authority of the nation. 15 · Caught ·up directly in a storm_

of allegedly "unstoppable progress, 11 globalized through their consumption of information a la
CNN, rendered verbose and arcane by media sound-bites and inter-active "virtual realities, 11 the
morally authoritative role of intellectuals has become a compensatory one at best. Once the
avant-garde, German intellectuals are now behind the times (and I suspect the same is true of
their counterparts world-wide). The German Mandarins, members of the Aujbaugeneration, and
even the Sixty-Eighters ·did claim a special role for themselves, i.e. as groups who stood for and
spoke for a "better Germany 11 --whether by virtue of their self-assumed ability to define national
identity from above, or by way of the postwar generations' efforts to define what German
national identity was not. What we see unfolding before us as a contemporary II national 11
movement in Germany is unreservedly anti-intellectual in character but also somewhat liberating
at its core.

For better or worse, members of the next generation have followed the do-it-

yourself lead of the cohorts immediately preceding them by striking out to define national
identity from below.
The function of literature, as Christa Wolf noted in a 1962 interview, is ohne Hysterie,
ohne Exultation urul Suche nach dem Abwegigen die Wahrheit zu finden ["to find the truth,
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without hysteria, without exultation and without the search for circumvention"]. 16 The function
of intellectuals in unified Germany, I would argue, ought to become that of inspiring others to
search for the truth regarding the national pasts, of critiquing all acts

of historical circumvention,

and generating new utopias now that the old ones have lost their meaning. Very few appear to
be up to that task at present.
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